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The document discusses those global economic developments fo r the year under review 
which are deemed to be o f interest to the Caribbean policy maker. It  also tries to highlight their 
implications fo r Caribbean policy. The paper begins by describing patterns o f growth and 
inflation in  the industrial, developing and transition countries, outlining the salient 
macroeconomic and global factors/determinants o f such developments. Special attention is given 
to the Asian crisis in  1997. It  provides a brie f overview o f global trade focusing on the 
institutional arrangements being negotiated to conduct it  via the W TO , F TA A  and the E U . 
Developments towards the E M U  are also given attention. The document concludes w ith a 
description o f international capital flows.
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The study o f global developments reveals a rich tapestry to inspire Caribbean development 
responses. A t the same time, it uncovers clear signposts to the emerging global framework and is 
replete w ith examples o f success and failure in  areas which the subregion cannot afford to ignore.
The small size o f Caribbean economies and their dispersion over a small and circumscribed 
geographic space means that they have a limited range o f production possibilities, some o f which 
they must trade to obtain the fu ll range o f goods and services necessary for well-being and economic 
expansion. Accordingly, a large proportion o f domestic production must be exportable, a fact which 
places a high premium on macro and microeconomic policies and domestic institutions which 
encourage the development and expansion o f productive enterprises. It  also means that items, 
whether they be destined as inputs fo r eventual exports or for immediate domestic consumption, 
should be sourced from the most efficient producers, fo r only in  this way are the greatest welfare 
benefits to be derived. Caribbean countries are, therefore, amongst the most trade-dependent in the 
world, as is illustrated by the fact that the value o f trade in goods and services exceeds the value o f 
Gross Domestic Product in  seven CARICOM  countries.
Small size also means that Caribbean countries have limited scope to shape markets or to 
influence global trends, factors which put a premium on good information and rapid response. In the 
past, special arrangements were fashioned fo r countries perceived to be at a disadvantage, whether 
the disadvantage derived from small size or low levels o f development. Accordingly, special 
preferences were granted, or derogations agreed from measures deemed to be the most onerous, for 
small or disadvantaged countries. W hile the record o f such measures is  mixed, the international 
mood has shifted towards the application o f universal criteria and the elimination, wherev er possible, 
o f special and differential treatment for all countries whether they be small and underde veloped, or 
not. The norm is now for reciprocity, most favoured nation (M EN) or fu ll national treatment.
W hile the rationale fo r this sh ift is vigorously debated, two factors seem to stand out. The  
firs t is practical, and relates to the need fo r simplification and standardization in  the face o f the 
already complex task o f creating a seamless global economic system. The second is conceptual and 
derives from doubt that preferences, aside from being costly to those granting them, are ever in  the 
long-term interest o f the so-called beneficiaries. The call for “trade and not aid” made by the 
developing countries in the 1970s, though they assumed preferential trade at the time, is now being 
taken seriously by many decision makers. Even the nature o f trade itse lf has changed, since it is now 
underpinned by liberalization and openness, contestability o f markets and the removal o f 
impediments to the free flow  o f goods and services. The proponents believe that integrated global 
markets eventually lead to economic convergence among the participants and this is, ultimately, the 
only viable means o f removing global inequities. As a corollary, aid flows have also declined.
Cited in support o f this new view is the fact that countries granted preferences because o f 
an inability to compete were seldom encouraged thereby to become competitive or to s liift to more 
appropriate activities. Conversely, many poor countries which have not benefited from preferences 
have evolved to become the most formidable global competitors. It  is  believed by some that 
preferences smack o f dependency and confer an anti-export bias. Several small countries at lower 
levels o f development than many Caribbean countries in the 1960s have also emerged by the 1980s 
and after to be successful competitors on global markets w ith rapidly expanding economies. Finally, 
on a broader macroeconomic front there is  a growing body o f evidence to support the theory o f 
convergence at the global level.
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Others are less enthusiastic about the benefits o f globalization which, by its  very nature, 
means that countries become progressively more absorbed in  global developments, sometimes by 
an insidious process over which they seem to have little  control. Countries might benefit from the 
gains from international trade but, simultaneously, become more threatened by international 
competition. New investments are spawned by the flows o f international capital but economies are 
destabilized by rapid capital movements. New technologies liberate increased efficiency but often 
engender uncomfortable social and organizational changes. People are enriched by cultural variety 
but can become more insecure by the adoption o f hitherto alien habits. Finally, while convergence 
might be evident among those who participate effectively in global markets some are in danger o f 
retreating from them and for those the prospect is not convergence but rather divergence as their 
economies get left behind.
Despite these differing views, the evidence provided over the last decade suggests that the 
project to integrate global markets is likely to prevail. While some regional initiatives are motivated 
by the objective o f slowing or eroding the global project others are fashioned to accelerate it, that 
is to create a seamless economic, political and juridical environment in  which to operate. Where 
initiatives are unlikely to go beyond the World Trade Organization (W TO ) to liberalize the trade in 
goods, which is proceeding rapidly, the immediate focus might be on services, investment and 
competition policies and ultimately into issues such as corruption, regularizing property law and the 
legal framework in  which such law w ill be adjudicated. The proposed Free Trade Area o f the 
Americas (FTA A ) incorporates all these elements under the rubric o f economic integration and goes 
further into areas such as financial coordination, education, democratic governance and multilateral 
cooperation, which includes jo int action on issues such as narcotic trafficking. If, as the F1A A  states, 
its  objective is to create an environment which is W TO  plus, it is  not beyond the bounds o f 
possibility that several sim ilar initiatives might resurface in  the W TO  itse lf, or in  other o f the 
regional arrangements being put into place in Asia and ultimately Africa. Several o f these initiatives 
are already underway w ithin the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) 
and a United States/European Union reopening is mooted. The pattern which seems to be emerging 
is  for these disparate activities to merge into a seamless global environment, w ith a high level o f 
commonality.
Given these emerging trends and given the lim ited scope for small countries to shift the rules 
o f the game, it would seem that they must best deploy their limited resources to discern trends and 
to devise measures to respond effectively to them. Countries are engaged in  a competitive game in 
which the best strategy is to apply sound economic policies and conform to best global practice, 
since countries which fa il to do so w ill be penalized by global actors, directly or indirectly. Th is  
paper is a modest attempt to glean such information from global developments in 1997 and to assist 
the policy maker to identify areas where further study and policy adaptation might be necessary. 
Several such issues surface in the body o f the text and are appropriately highlighted since the 
greatest challenge facing the Caribbean policy maker is to ensure that regional policies ans consistent 
with global trends.
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OUTPUT, INFLATION A N D  REGIONAL PERFORMANCE
Table I  
GROWTH IN G.D.P.
1993 1994 1995 1996 1997
Global Output 2.6 3.9 3.6 4.0 4.1
Advanced economies 1.2 3.2 2.5 2.7 3.0
European Union -0.5 2.9 2.5 1.7 2.6
Developing countries 6.5 6.8 5.9 6.4 5.9
Africa 1.0 2.6 2.9 5.3 3.4
Asia 9.3 9.6 8.9 81 6.8
Middle East and Europe 3.9 0.7 3.5 4.6 4.1
Latin America 3.9 5.4 0.2 3.5 5.3
Countries in transition -6.7 -7.6 -1.3 0.1 1.9
Russia, Transcaucasus, & Central Asia -9.0 -12.5 -3.9 -1.9 1.3
Central and Eastern Europe -4.1 -2.6 1.3 1.5 2.4
Source: I.M.F. World Economic Outlook (Interim assessment, December 1997); ECLAC.
Global output increased slightly over the fairly solid performance achieved in  1996. The bulk 
o f the increase came from the advanced countries and the countries in transition, fo r the developing 
countries recorded a 0.5 per cent decline over 1996. Nevertheless, while the advanced countries grew 
at a relatively slow pace o f 3 per cent and the countries in transition as a group expanded on last 
year’s barely positive growth, to record a figure just under two per cent, the developing countries 
continued to record strong performance o f ju st under 6 per cent. W ith in  the various categories 
performance remained uneven. Global output was also hampered by the economic crisis being 
experienced by the highest performers in Asia whose growth rate declined. Nevertheless, the fu ll 
impact o f the Asian crisis w ill not be evident until 1998 and beyond.
The performance o f the advanced countries continued to be led by the United States, which 
posted its sixth year o f sustained expansion and the highest rate achieved since 1984. In contrast, the 
E .U ., while improving on its performance in  1996, s till only achieved 2.6 per cent, while Japan 
suffered a further setback to its  incipient economic recovery following the developments in  Asia.
In  the United States strong output growth was accompanied by vigorous job creation and 
falling inflation. Projections fo r 1997 were for 2 per cent GDP growth w ith an average 
unemployment rate o f 5.3 per cent. The result at the end o f 1997 was much above expectations, for 
output expanded by 3.9 per cent while unemployment and inflation both fell, to 4.9 per cent and 1.7 
per cent, respectively. Moreover, private investment accounted for one third o f the expansion and 
helped to create 3.2 m illion jobs. The high levels o f new investment also served to increase 
productivity thus restraining inflation.
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Table I I
INFLATION AND INTEREST RATES
1993 1994 1995 1996 1997
Inflation <1>
Advanced economies 3.1 2.6 2.5 2.4 2.2
European Union 3.8 3.0 2.9 2.5 1.9
Japan 1.2 0.7 -0.1 0.1 1.7
U.S.A. 3.0 2.6 2.8 2.9 2.4
Developing countries 46.6 51.0 22.7 13.3 9.0
Africa 29.3 39.3 32.9 25.2 14.1
Asia 10.3 14.8 11.9 6.8 4.1
Middle East and Europe 24.6 31.9 35.7 24.7 22.3
Latin America 882.2 335.1 25.9 18.4 10.5
Countries in transition
Central and Eastern Europe 357.7 153.3 75.3 32.4 38.9
Russia 699.8 302.0 190.1 47.8 15.8
Transcaucasus and Central Asia 1224.2 1667.7 250.4 65.3 36.1
Interest rates <2>
Major Industrial countries 6.6 7.1 6.8 6.1 5.8
U.S.A. 6.2 6.7 6.3 5.8 5.5
Source: I.M.F. World Economic Outlook (Interim assessment, December 1997); ECLAC. 
<1> Percentage change in consumer prices
<2> Long-term interest rates, in percent. Data for 1997 relates to August 1997
Table I I I  
UNEMPLOYMENT RATES (%)
1993 1994 1995 1996 1997
Advanced economies 7.7 7.6 7.3 7.3 7.1
European Union 11.2 11.6 11.2 11.4 11.1
France 11.6 12.3 11.6 12.4 12.6
Germany 8.8 9.6 9.4 10.3 11.5
Japan 2.5 2.9 3.1 3.3 3.4
United Kingdom 10.3 9.3 8.2 7.5 5.7
United States 6.9 6.1 5.6 5.4 4.9
Source: I.M.F. World Economic Outlook (Interim assessment, December 1997); National data.
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Restraint in  public spending was reflected in the budget deficit which had contracted for five 
consecutive years, to rest at 0.3 per cent o f Product in  1997. A  balanced budget was projected for 
1999. The stronger than expected fiscal performance was to be explained by the virtuous cycle 
created by a buoyant economy, with many more people and firm s paying more taxes and with fewer 
persons seeking social benefits. Complacency w ith respect to the public finances was not yet 
warranted, however, given the major task which needed to be tackled, to adjust social services to the 
increased demands o f an ageing population.
The strong overall performance came as a surprise, given that the economy was in  its sixth 
year o f expansion and was, therefore, on past performance expected to be at or beyond the peak o f 
the business cycle. Th is  was also underlined by the low level o f unemployment which, on past 
performance, would have exceeded the non-accelerating inflation rate o f unemployment (N A IRU ) 
previously believed to be 5.5 per cent. Nevertheless, pressures were appearing, in the job market 
where unemployment fe ll to 4.6 per cent the end o f the year, via extremely strong and growing 
domestic demand and evidenced by the growing external deficit and the strong performance in  the
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stock market. Developments in  Asia might paradoxically benefit the economy by restraining an 
economy on the point o f overheating. However, the uneven distribution o f the gains from recent 
strong performance remained a concern. The very dynamism shown by the private sector has, in  the 
short term, heightened wage differentials and, therefore, the income inequalities existing between 
those activities in the ascendancy and those in decline.
In Canada, the economic expansion which commenced in  mid-1996 continued in  1997, with 
a slight reduction in  unemployment while inflation remained w ithin the target range o f 1-3 per cent. 
The decline in interest rates, made possible by rapid fiscal consolidation, together w ith favourable 
exchange rates gave a significant fillip  to business confidence and encouraged increased investment. 
As economic activity quickened modest interest rate increases became necessary in  the second half 
o f 1997. Nevertheless, w ith significant unutilized capacity the trend toward moderate expansion with 
low inflation is expected to continue in  1998.
In contrast, European Union (EU) performance was uneven. The United Kingdom 
economy has since 1993 managed to expand steadily towards its  fu ll potential, while reducing 
unemployment to relatively low levels in  1997. The steady appreciation o f sterling has not restrained 
output since buoyant domestic demand has offset flagging export performance. Moreover, the 
spectre o f overheating and increased inflation has been faced by the decision to give the Bank o f 
England operational independence in monetary policy while inflationary targets have been set at 2.5 
per cent. Monetary policy has, accordingly, been tightened and fiscal consolidation has been 
accelerated. W hile strong domestic demand remains a source o f some unease, the prognosis is for 
further economic expansion in  1998 w ith only a minimal increase in  inflation. Unemployment is 
expected to fa ll further, to about 5 per cent.
Several other small E .U . countries, are either approaching fu ll capacity utilization or have 
started to move toward it. Ireland, Norway and the Netherlands fa ll into the former category, while 
Finland, Sweden, Spain and Portugal fa ll into the latter. Austria, Belgium and Switzerland continue 
to experience considerable unutilized capacity since their economies tend to be strongly influenced 
by France and Germany.
The other three major E U  economies namely, France Germany and Italy experienced 
sluggish performance, in part because o f the need to force their economies into the strictures o f 
Maastricht fiscal targets. While domestic demand remained sluggish they have been trying to export 
themselves out o f the doldrums. Construction activity was especially slow. Chronically high rates 
o f domestic unemployment, caused by sluggish performance and rigid labour markets, served to 
accentuate consumer insecurity. Rigid labour markets further slowed the deep restructuring required 
for long-term growth.
The prognosis fo r 1998 was fo r only a slight increase in  the economic tempo o f these 
countries with minimal reduction in  unemployment. The fiscal strictures w ill remain severe as they 
seek to qualify for the European Monetary Union (EM U) in May 1998, especially in  Italy where the 
degree o f consolidation necessary is s till quite large and in France where some slippage is becoming
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evident. Moreover, the external market was unlikely to be as propitious fo r them in 1998 so that 
export performance could not be relied upon to pull these economies out o f their torpor.
Given the strong performance o f Western Germany in preceding decades, current fiscal and 
labour imbalances need to be seen in the light o f difficulties being experienced to reincorporate its 
eastern lander. Th is  relates specifically to the need to absorb and restructure obsolete enterprises in 
the east and make the necessary public transfers, equivalent to U S$  201 b illion per annum. The  
adjustment o f the eastern lander is  further complicated since these transfers are to be phased out 
while simultaneously wages rates are to converge. Currently, unemployment in the eastern lander 
runs at over 19 per cent, but productivity lags behind the western lander. W hile wage rates are not 
yet equal to the west, u n it labour costs in the east exceed those in the west by one third, making it 
among the most expensive in the world. High unit labour costs inhibit labour intensive investment 
to favour capital intensive plant. Th is, in  turn, inhibits job creation generally and services industries 
particularly.
In Japan the economic recovery which appeared to be underway in late 1996 and early 1997 
faltered in the second quarter o f 1997. Growth, originally expected to be about 2.3 per cent achieved 
no more than 1 per cent in  1997, w ith scarcely any faster expansion anticipated fo r 1998. The  
underlying fragility o f the Japanese economy resulted from the decline in asset prices in  the early 
1990s and the resulting problem loans fo r the financial system. W hile external performance, 
benefitting from the depreciation o f the Yen vis à vis the United States dollar, was strong, domestic 
demand remained weak. Here low levels o f consumer and business confidence were further 
depressed by a jump in  consumption tax and reduced public investment, equivalent to 2 per cent o f 
Product, which took effect in  the second quarter o f 1997.
The slowdown in  the economy taken together w ith difficulties in  Asia, to which the Japanese 
economy is closely tied, renewed doubts about the capacity o f the financial institutions to strengthen 
their portfolios and grow out o f their weakness, in  the short run. Moreover, the failure o f a major 
bank and later a securities firm , which exposed significant hidden losses and malfeasance in the 
regulatory apparatus, caused further concern as to the extent to which relevant information had been 
concealed from the public. These developments further eroded confidence and prompted the stock 
market to continue the downward spiral. Anxiety was further increased by the planned financial 
deregulation, the so called “Big-Bang” to take place in  1998 and the capacity o f the financial 
institutions, given their current fragility, to face up to international competition and tighter regulatory 
standards.
Output in the developing countries continued to be strong, though not as strong as in 1996. 
A ll developing country regions recorded reduced performance, with the exception o f Latin America. 
Fo r the developing countries as a whole, the Asian crisis had a relatively modest effect in  1997, 
estimated to be a decline o f 0.3 per cent in  growth. The impact in 1998 is estimated to be more 
substantial, w ith a contraction o f 1.3 per cent being projected at th is stage, although the crisis 
might not have worked itse lf through. Even this modest estimate would mean the lowest rate o f 
growth fo r the developing countries since 1990. In general, those dependent upon large international
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financial flows were likely to be the most affected in 1998 since capital flows, especially longer-term 
development capital to the developing countries were likely to fa ll again. Asia and Latin America 
are, therefore, likely to be the most affected, w ith Africa and the Middle East being relatively 
immune since they are not significantly exposed to global capital flows.
Performance varied fo r the developing countries in 1997. In sub-Saharan Africa, growth 
picked up in 1996 and was expected to remain in the region o f 4-5 per cent in 1997-1998. Strong 
performance was also becoming more broad based. Whereas in 1994,10 o f the 47 countries recorded 
negative growth this applied to only one country in 1997. Moreover, whereas 26 countries achieved 
growth in excess o f 3 per cent in  1994 no less than 35 did so in 1997. The average rate o f inflation 
was also falling steadily, from 46 per cent in 1994 to about 19 per cent in 1997. Whereas 12 
countries recorded inflation rates o f less than 10 per cent in 1994,33 managed to do so in 1997. Yet 
th is improved performance is essentially a case o f retrieving lost ground. I f  per capita income 
increased by 1 per cent per annum until 2006 it would return to the income per capita figure achieved 
in 1982 but s till be 5 per cent below that achieved in 1974.
Th is  performance was not achieved by buoyant raw material prices, since the terms o f trade 
deteriorated steadily for the group as a whole over the period 1995-1997. Neither was expansion the 
result o f large capital inflows, since private capital inflows averaged 1.1 per cent o f Product in 1997, 
a decline from 2 per cent in  1996. In fact, domestic factors explained the good growth performance 
in this region, not the least o f which was policy reform. Despite progress being made across several 
countries, in South Africa and Nigeria policy reform remains to be addressed i f  these economies are 
to approach their potential. Moreover, the group remains generally fragile and susceptible to external 
shocks and the challenge o f mobilizing resources fo r strong future development remains to be met. 
The problem is complicated by the fact that the region is losing out on foreign capital, now merely 
3.3 per cent o f developing country flows and down from 6 per cent in  the latter ha lf o f the 1980s.
While investor confidence in South Africa improved after the national elections in 1994 and 
the moderate economic policies followed immediately thereafter, unemployment remained high at 
over 30 per cent. However, this confidence was eroded by 1996, consequent on the deterioration o f 
several macroeconomic indicators. Th is  resulted in capital flight and steady erosion o f the exchange 
rate1. The result was that growth slowed, investment declined and inflation increased in 1996. By  
1997, investor confidence and capital inflows returned as the depreciation o f the exchange rate, down 
by 8 per cent in real effective terms, contributed to an earlier than anticipated correction o f the 
external current account. New fiscal policies, including a privatization programme, were also 
adopted to stabilize the economy. The new policies for equitable expansion and which emphasize 
growth, employment and redistribution and are entitled G EA R, have met w ith popular support but 
s till remain to be fu lly  elaborated.
’For example, the deficit for fiscal year 1996/1997 exceeded 5 per cent of Product while the ex ternal deficit 
for 1995 was 2.1 per cent of Product. Inflation increased from 5.5 per cent for the period April 1995-1996 to 9.9 per 
cent for the corresponding period 1996-1997.
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Developing countries in  N orth A frica, the Middle Ea st and Europe have recently been 
experiencing improved economic performance and were expected to continue to record growth in 
the range o f 4-5 per cent in  the period 1997-1998, despite the decline in  o il prices. Strongest 
expansion, o f between 5-7.5 per cent, was being experienced by Egypt, Iran, Jordan, Lebanon, 
Tunisia and the Republic o f Yemen. Inflation is projected to fa ll below 9 per cent for the region as 
a whole, the lowest rate since the early 1980s. The majority o f these countries achieved rates below 
4 per cent, although Turkey went against the trend o f falling inflation rates experiencing inflation 
o f around 80 per cent. Aggregate debt and debt service ratios also declined in 1997.
The Asian crisis caused a reduction in  the rate o f growth in that region from over 8 per cent 
on average for the period 1992-1996 to under 7 per cent in 1997. A  further reduction to under 6 per 
cent is projected for 1998. The impact is not expected to be evenly spread over the Asian countries, 
however, since the A SEA N  4, comprising Indonesia, Malaysia, the Phillippines and Thailand 
showed the steepest declines, growth falling from 7.4 per cent in 1996 to 4 per cent in  1997 and this
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is projected to fa ll further, to 1.7 per cent in  1998. The stock markets o f these four, together with 
South Korea, declined in  value by U S $6 billion. A  comparison o f estimates before the crisis and 
those made at the end o f 1997 showed a downgrading o f Asian output by almost 1 per cent for 1997 
and 1.7 per cent fo r 1998. Fo r the A SEA N  4 the impact o f the crisis has been much more severe with 
projections for output to be downgraded by 1.6 per cent o f GDP in  1997 and 3.7 per cent o f GDP 
in  1998.
The survey o f global economic developments for 1996 commented on the quickening 
integration o f global markets. It also noted the fact that certain emerging markets, especially in  
Asia, had developed synergies and a virtuous cycle o f their own, so that global activity was 
becoming less dependent upon the locomotive effect traditionally exerted by the advanced 
economies. Developments in 1997 were to confirm these interrelationships. Th is  time, however, the 
evidence was perverse, the strong links manifesting themselves in  the form o f a vicious cycle which 
served to reduce the credibility and growth prospects o f one after another o f these economies.
The vicious cycle began when foreign investors lost confidence in  the capacity o f Thailand 
to take sufficiently rapid and determined action to deal w ith its growing external imbalance, which 
had moved steadily from a current account deficit equivalent to 5 per cent o f Product in 1993 to 7.9 
per cent in  19962. Th is  had been covered by capital inflows, the pegged exchange rate regime and 
low international interest rates continuing to encourage external borrowing and overexposure o f 
domestic firm s and financial institutions to exchange rate risk. Following the collapse o f the Thai 
equity market and the inability o f the Government to defend the currency against speculators 
convinced that the exchange rate could not hold, bond and currency markets began to see sim ilar 
weaknesses throughout the region3. Loss o f confidence and resultant capital outflows spread 
throughout the region causing already marginal currencies to collapse.
The resulting Asian financial crisis was perhaps the most noteworthy development in  1997. 
Th is  was so, in part, because to the casual observer it was so unexpected, tarnishing what had been 
the seemingly invincible Asian economic performance. It was also noteworthy in  that it provided 
a real life  laboratory to study the interaction between national and integrating global markets and to 
observe the interplay between macroeconomic policies and business/entrepreneurial perceptions.
While worrying signs began to appear early in 1997, the tarnishing o f the eastern miracle 
commenced in Thailand in  mid-May but, because o f the inter-linkages in  these economies and 
because the economies manifested many common symptoms, the erosion had spread throughout the
2 Malaysia, and to a lesser extent, Indonesia, Korea and the Phillippines also suffered growing external current 
account deficits.
3 These weaknesses included fixed exchange rates, with real exchange rate appreciation, slowdown in exports, 
persistent current account deficits financed by portfolio inflows and rising external debt. These factors exposed 
substantial unhedged foreign currency borrowing by the private sector, inflated domestic property markets, a weak 
overexposed and inadequately supervised banking system and a lack of transparency in business and financial affairs.
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region by the end o f the year. In itia lly  the issues in  Thailand spilled over into Malay sia and the 
Phillippines, at firs t in  the equity markets. By  July, the contagion effect in the exchange markets was 
underway, following Thailand’s inability to regain investor confidence w ith credible policies or to 
defend the Baht from the subsequent speculative attacks. By  July 14, the Malaysian currency was 
set afloat, then the Singapore currency on July 17, the Indonesian currency on August 14 and by 
August 15 the Hong Kong dollar was under pressure. Subsequently, the crisis was also to spread 
further, to strike South Korea where the Won depreciated rapidly. It was ultimately to come to rest 
in Japan, the initia l engine o f the Asian miracle, where after currency depreciation the crisis struck 
home to the already hurting Japanese financial sector.
Ripples were felt further afield, notably in B ra zil in  October, where the Sao Paulo stock 
exchange lost one third o f its value and the authorities had to put a stabilization package in place to 
shore up the economy. Even so, the authorities lost 13 per cent o f the foreign reserves to defend the 
Real from speculative attacks. Bu t other countries in Latin America were not immune either, while 
the industrialized countries suffered severe turmoil in their stock markets. Moreover, they are s till 
calculating the likely impact o f these developments, which might not yet have been completely 
played out, on their economies. Finally, the severe currency depreciations have put a keener edge 
on the export performance o f several Asian producers and left others, notably China, w ith an 
exposed currency. These changes w ill impact the current accounts and exchange rates o f potential 
competitors in developing and advanced economies alike and could, conceivably, set o ff a new 
round o f instability.
W hile the Asian crisis was in some senses a replay o f the Mexican peso crisis, which 
commenced w ith declining economic fundamentals, the loss o f investor confidence, capital flow  
reversals and spillover effects into various adjacent countries, there were also noteworthy 
differences. The Asian countries were not victims o f public sector profligacy and they had a 
sustained track record o f strong economic performance. Rather, funds were channelled into 
investment some o f which was o f dubious viability, including into property, in  part because it was 
channeled to favoured family or institutional allies. Th is  was possible because o f influence peddling 
and lax prudential regulations which ultimately led to deteriorating loan portfolios. Th is  together 
w ith the fact that Asian businesses held greater domestic debt impacted the banks more severely. 
Mexico was also closely tied to the United States via N A FTA  at a time o f expanding world trade so 
that the United States economy was able to assist in Mexico’s recovery by absorbing its exports. 
Finally, Mexico encouraged by the IM F and the United States adopted a comprehensive recovery 
programme and immediately restructured its  financial sector, whereas past successes in Asia have 
caused the authorities to be more cautious in  changing what had been seen as the ideal model.
Asian businesses had become highly dependent upon foreign debt, some o f it  short term. As 
exchange rates collapsed and remedial measures in the form o f increased interest rates were applied, 
domestic firm s were unable to service the debt and consequently sank into insolvency. Increasing 
bad debts and non-performing assets adversely affected the balance sheets and, therefore, the 
solvency o f banks. Accordingly, in  Asia the currency crisis was linked to a banking crisis and both 
were much more severe than had been initia lly expected. The rapid contagion was evidence o f both
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the downside effect o f global financial integration and o f regional product and trade integration. 
Given a propitious global environment, these economies should be able to recommence growth, via 
keener export performance outside o f the region, until regional demand is  able to recommence the 
virtuous cycle from which they benefited up until recently. Nevertheless, the severity o f the crisis 
should not be underestimated.
External developments were also a factor in  the Asian crisis. The flow o f funds to developing 
countries was, in recent years, prompted by the need to seek better returns than were available in the 
mature economies where interest rates were falling and economic activities were in  the doldrums. 
After the Mexican crisis there was also a temporary sh ift away from Latin America to Asia though 
recently capital flows to Latin America have resumed. As economic activity increased, especially 
in the United States and as interest rates started to rise, investors turned their interest once again to 
the mature markets. A  further factor was the linkage o f several Asian currencies to the United States 
dollar. While the dollar depreciated in  1994-1995 these countries gained competitiveness but after 
mid 1995 as it began to appreciate, while file Japanese Yen fe ll, they were to suffer severe erosion 
in competitiveness, which was not counteracted by domestic exchange rate policy.
Several lessons can be learned from the Asian crisis. As was the case in  Mexico, delay in 
taking action was the main culprit in  Thailand. There, strong, consistent past performance lulled 
policy makers into a false sense o f security and made them reluctant to tamper w ith a tried formula 
even when economic fundamentals had commenced their decline. In itia l defense o f the currency 
caused severe losses in  reserves. Delay, together w ith financial sector problems and political 
uncertainties came together to shake investor confidence, which transformed the decline into a 
avalanche.
In  contrast, in  several other countries the stampede effect seemed to have a greater impact 
than the economic fundamentals seemed to warrant. Th is  was in  part to be explained by the 
fickleness o f foreign investors, who in itia lly  thought the countries could do no wrong but w ith a 
reversal o f sentiment sought rapidly to exit from the currency. B y  way o f illustration, net capital 
flows to the Asian economies grew from U S$ 62 billion in 1994 to U S$  101 billion in 1996 but the 
upward trend was reversed in  1997 as they received U S$  34 billion. Fo r the A SEA N  4 the trends 
were even more stark being U S$  19 b illion in 1994, U S$  35 billion in  1996 and U SS-4 .1 billion in  
1997. Such capital reversals were inherent where investments were financed w ith borrowed money 
and where lenders based their decisions not on how the proceeds o f loans were to be used but rather 
on the rates o f return, hoping to minimize the risk  w ith rapid response times. The lesson here was 
that while economic fundamentals remained paramount, they could fo r a time be obscured by other 
phenomena falling under the rubric o f “confidence” which also exerted a significant effect.
Focus on economic fundamentals, therefore, needs to be unwavering (and indeed preemptive 
action might be necessary where contiguous or otherwise linked economies came under siege). One 
area o f focus would seem to be on maintaining appropriate real exchange rates, and indeed on 
appropriate and credible exchange rate procedures. Few unambiguous lessons were to be learned 
from the Asian crisis. Nevertheless, it was clear that defense o f the currency, in  all cases where it
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was attempted, w ith the exception o f Hong Kong, was expensive and doomed to fail. Yet the 
currency board arrangements which (just) weathered the onslaught on the Hong Kong dollar, while 
seemingly appropriate for small economies like Hong Kong were not without cost. Fo r example, that 
country had to maintain reserves in  excess o f U S$  90 b illion which exceeded all the currency in 
circulation and had to maintain impeccable macroeconomic fundamentals. The model is not 
universally applicable and is not deemed, at this time, to be appropriate for Indonesia which sought 
to establish a currency board o f its  own.
It  was also essential that policies should be followed which were conducive to moderate 
market determined interest rates, which would not damage domestic economic activity, induce 
excessive amounts o f short-term capital inflows or foreclose on policy tools intended to induce 
further monetary tightening, where this became necessary. Th is  implied credible and consistent 
macroeconomic policies, stable and efficient financial institutions and a socio-political and 
psychological environment conducive to building confidence in local and foreign economic actors, 
alike. The need to raise interest rates to stem capital flight caused the market to focus on the debt 
profile and decimate several enterprises dependent on such debt which in  turn weakened die financial 
sector. Overreaction by Malaysia, in  the form o f destabilizing political rhetoric and attempts to 
redirect blame and reimpose rigid currency controls, served to override other credible policies, 
exacerbate the mood o f panic and accelerate the rate o f capital flight in  Malaysia and :in adjacent 
countries.
Attention to other structural policies, such as better banking supervision and greater 
transparency to ensure sound financial systems was also necessary. Closer attention needs also to 
be paid to the timing o f capital account liberalization and the adoption o f measures to discourage and 
lim it the frequency o f movement o f short-term speculative capital4. Lack o f transparency and 
unreliable indicators were instrumental in  eroding confidence in  both Korea and Indonesia. When 
the external debt in  Korea was discovered to be US$100 billion, twice the previously thought figure, 
confidence in  the capacity o f that country to service the debt was severely eroded. Sim ilarly, when 
the spotlight was placed in  the murky comer o f private sector debt o f Indonesia, in itia lly believed 
to be U S$  55 billion but subsequently estimated to be as much as US$50 billion more, a substantial 
portion o f which was short-term debt, confidence collapsed to nu llify  the text book preemptive 
policies in itia lly  pursued.
4 Capital inflows can put severe upward pressure on the exchange rate which if allowed to float freely can 
reduce the competitiveness of domestic enterprises. If rates are held administratively, the flows can increase inflation 
or erode the current account of the balance of payments. Several approaches have been tried, the most obvious being 
for the Central Bank to sterilize the inflows but this can be expensive and counter-productive, others have raised 
statutory reserve requirements while some countries shift public sector deposits from commercial banks to die Central 
Bank. Another tool is to limit the open foreign currency positions of commercial banks through prudential regulations. 
Chile in 1992 allowed some appreciation of the rate while more recently it introduced selective capital controls to 
penalize short-term flows. This topic warrants much more detailed treatment than is possible in this paper if the costs 
and benefits of the various options are to be fully explored.
Moreover, issues o f probity and governance were also brought to the fore. Where special 
groups were favoured, policies were distorted to serve narrow interest groups, such as the firs t family 
in  Indonesia, or large enterprises in  Korea5. Reports indicate a lack o f evenhandedness in  the 
treatment o f family interests and a failure o f w ill when the fu ll impact on these interests became 
evident. Strong efforts from the highest level to establish a currency board in  Indonesia, w ith a fixed 
(appreciated) exchange rate, which was contrary to the best international advice, was thought to be 
motivated by the need to protect those interests holding large external debts and to the detriment o f 
those which had pursued more prudent policies. Issues o f probity also surfaced in  the financial 
sector in  Japan, where bank regulators were accused o f tipping o ff major institutions about 
inspections and where reports were rigged to protect them.
The Asian crisis brought home the fact that national economic agents operating in  an open 
global environment had reduced scope for laxity at the macroeconomic and microeconomic levels. 
Greater attention, therefore, needed to be paid to economic fundamentals despite the seeming lack 
o f attention given them by investors. Undue reliance on purely market signals as a guide to action 
could be extremely risky, as it  often created over-confidence on the part o f policy makers and 
entrepreneurs, alike. Since the market was usually governed by inertia, its  in itia l slowness to react 
could encourage risk  taking and even recklessness on the part o f the recipients o f capital inflows. 
Once potential dangers became evident to the investors o f such capital, however, the corollary to 
inattention was stampede to exit the currency before erosion set in. The stampede, in  turn, was se lf 
fu lfillin g  in  creating economic collapse.
The rapid contagion effects evident in  Asia should also alert economically integrating regions 
to the need for better regional surveillance and the adoption o f measures to bolster the efforts o f 
partners to apply best practice at the national level. Loss o f confidence in one country could damage 
others in  a regional partnership w ith relatively sound economies. E ffo rts by CARICOM  countries 
in the area o f monetary policy surveillance should be strengthened. Innovative measures such as 
cross national banking surveillance arrangements might also be considered, while renewed efforts 
by the E U  to agree upon a set o f early warning arrangements to alert policy makers before 
speculators entered the market would also bear watching.
Reforms are likely in  the policies o f International Financial Institutions (IF Is) following the 
Asian crisis. Agencies such as the IM F  are likely to become more aggressive in demanding 
information and in  vetting the information fo r accuracy following accusations that it was tardy in  
predicting instability in  some countries or indecisive regarding the policies o f others. Some o f the 
data provided to the Fund was also shown to be grossly inaccurate, sufficiently so to lead to 
misjudgements in  policy. Greater emphasis is likely to be placed on short-term capital flows and on 
the policies governing the capital account generally. Greater focus is  also likely to be put on the 
compliance o f domestic financial institutions w ith international standards. Internal Fund policies are
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also being reviewed w ith respect to the adoption o f measures to slow capital movements in  a crisis 
and to provide better funding fo r countries in  difficulty.
Aside from the technical and policy lessons to be learned from the crisis, analysts are also 
trying to evaluate the consequences o f it for the global economy. The in itia l prognosis is for a 
decline o f between 0.3 to 0.6 per cent o f GDP for the OECD countries in  1998 and o f 0.6-1.2 per 
cent o f GDP in 1999. While this seems to be manageable, it does not include the cost o f a potential 
deflationary spiral which is a growing concern o f some analysts. The fact is  that w ith domestic 
demand falling in  the affected countries they w ill need to export their way out o f the crisis6.
Growth in La tin  America in 1997 was stronger than achieved fo r 25 years, w ith 5.3 per cent 
recorded as compared w ith an average o f 3.2 per cent for the period 1991-1996. Per capita GDP was
6 The implications of this are further expanded in the section on capital flows.
16
estimated to have increased by 3.6 per cent, making a cumulative per capita increase o f 13 per cent 
for the decade. The increased rate o f economic expansion was evident throughout the region, few 
countries experiencing slower rates o f growth than in 1996. S ix  countries, Argentina, Chile, the 
Dominican Republic, Mexico, Peru and Uruguay recorded growth o f between 6-8 per cent while 
in seven others it  was between 4-6 per cent. Nine countries had growth rates o f around 3 per cent. 
Preliminary indications are that three Caribbean countries, namely, Haiti, Jamaica and Saint Lucia 
had little  or no growth.
Inflation for the region fe ll from a high o f 888 per cent in  1993 to 10.5 per cent in  1997, the 
lowest rate achieved in  50 years. In  most countries it  declined, while in 13 o f the 22 countries 
surveyed inflation was now in single digits. The highest rate o f inflation was in Venezuela which, 
nevertheless, managed to reduce it from 103 per cent in 1996 to 38 per cent in  1997. B ra zil which 
as recently as 1993 experienced inflation o f2489 per cent, had managed to reduce it  to 4.1 per cent 
in  1997. The sharp decrease in  inflation in  Latin America was to be explained in  part because o f 
structural changes in  the global economy which tended to lower inflation and also to reward 
countries which achieved low inflation. As a consequence, domestic policies in  Latin America had 
been geared to inflation fighting, w ith positive results.
The positive outcomes for growth and inflation were, however, accompanied by an increase 
in the current account deficit, moving from US$35 billion in 1996 to US$60 billion in  1997, or 3 per 
cent o f Product. The increased deficit was fa irly widespread, fo r in eight countries the deficit 
exceeded 4 per cent o f Product while in  Bolivia, Haiti, Nicaragua and Paraguay it exceeded 5 per 
cent. The overall average was also heavily weighted by deficits in  B ra zil (where it exceeded 4 per 
cent o f Product) Argentina and Mexico.
The deficit was to be explained by an 18 per cent surge in the value o f imports mainly to 
Bra zil and Argentina and a reduced surplus in  Mexico. More generally the reasons for increased 
imports were increased domestic demand, especially from investment in  most countries, real 
currency appreciation in practically all the countries, especially Mexico and Venezuela, and the 
loosening o f import restrictions or reduction in ta riffs in Central America and Brazil. The prices o f 
imports were lower for most countries.
Exports, which could not keep pace w ith the growth in imports, were, nevertheless, strong. 
For the region as a whole export volumes increased by 11 per cent, twice the rate o f output and also 
in excess o f the increase in world trade volumes. Th is  was achieved despite widespread appreciation 
o f the currency, although a high proportion o f the exports was destined for other Latin American 
countries7.
Nevertheless, capital inflows estimated at US$73 b illion more than covered the deficit. 
Inflows were particularly strong in  the firs t three quarters, although the flow slackened in  the final
7 MERCOSUR increased its Common External Tariff by 3 per cent in November 1997.
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quarter as a result o f the Asian crisis. Foreign Direct Investment (FD I) amounted to US$44 billion, 
the highest recorded, w ith particularly strong inflows being received by B ra zil, the Dominican 
Republic, Mexico and Venezuela. F D I flows were encouraged by more liberal and deregulated 
economies and by greater macroeconomic stability. Fo r the region as a whole the proceeds from  
privatization accounted fo r about one quarter o f F D I flows, although for B ra zil the proportion was 
higher. Bond placements, unlike FD I, were restricted to relatively few countries notably Argentina 
Brazil and Mexico, placements being made primarily by governments. Equity investments continued 
to account fo r a small portion o f the capital entering Latin America, being significant only in 
Argentina, B ra zil, Chile and Mexico.
The external debt o f Latin America increased by 2.5 per cent, a slower rate o f increase than 
in  1996. The increases were confined primarily to B ra zil, Chile and Colombia in  the form o f 
increased private sector borrowing and to Argentina where the increase was in  public sector debt. 
In  general, external debt indicators were improving, now being sim ilar to those registered prior to 
the external debt crisis o f the 1980s.
The prospects for 1998 remained fairly good, though growth is likely to return to the average 
achieved for the decade about 3.5 per cent. Th is  Economic Commission fo r La tin America and the 
Caribbean (EC LAC ) estimate, for a 1.8 per cent contraction compared w ith 1997, was based on an 
evaluation o f likely global developments and likely internal macroeconomic policies. The IM F has 
also projected 3.5 per cent growth fo r the region, revised downward by 0.9 per cent after the Asian 
crisis. The World Bank has estimated that the Asian crisis w ill have a greater impact and be directly 
responsible in  a 1.5 per cent contraction in Product in Latin America. Inflation was expected to 
continue to be moderate, while external current account deficits were expected to moderate in the 
face o f concentrated efforts by the region to rebalance its economy in the face o f reduced capital 
inflows. Unemployment was likely to contract only slowly.
An examination o f firs t semester performance for the Caribbean countries pro vided scant 
hope fo r improved economic performance8. Preliminary indications suggested that output did not 
increase as quickly across the Caribbean as it did in  the firs t semester o f 1996. Moreover, fiscal 
deficits increased in  most countries, mainly because o f buoyant public spending. In the few instances 
where gains were made on recurrent account they were used to bolster capital formation. External 
performance was also generally weak, fo r the traditional export crops were facing new marketing 
constraints and depressed prices. Simultaneously, imports burgeoned in  some cases because o f 
disequilibria elsewhere in  the economy. While tourist earnings were generally encouraging they were 
insufficient to offset declines elsewhere, so that several countries were running down their reserves. 
Prices remained moderate in all instances w ith the exception o f Jamaica, which, nevertheless,
8 Further details about Caribbean economic developments are to be found in ECLAC/CDCC document entitled, 
“Review of Caribbean economic performance - 1997"(LC/CAR/G.512) which is based on data for the period January 
to June 1997 and from which this section is abstracted. The annual review entitled, “Overview of Caribbean economic 
performance - 1997" is forthcoming.
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recorded a decline over the firs t semester o f 1996. Fo r the most part, unemployment which had been 
inching down in recent years o f relatively strong growth showed signs o f inching up again.
Policy focused on the two perennial problems, achieving and maintaining macroeconomic 
stability, on one hand, and expanding economic activity on the other. Most governments tried their 
hand at the second only after achieving some measure o f success in the first. Where both goals were 
being pursued simultaneously, policy inconsistencies were evident which jeopardized success in 
both. Sub-themes were concerns about equity and the reorientation o f production away from sectors 
which seemed to have declining future prospects. In only one instance did the policy maker have the 
luxury o f being able to focus mainly on achieving higher levels o f productivity to relieve the labour 
shortage faced by that economy.
Throughout the region structural reforms continued, notably in  the area o f fiscal policy, to 
make tax regimes more transparent and to substitute consumption taxes fo r declining trade taxes, to 
improve compliance and tax collection mechanisms and to remove loss making and other business 
operations from the public accounts, through privatization. Reforms were also evident in  response 
to continuing liberalization, especially in the areas o f trade and the financial sector.
Fo r the countries surveyed, only Trinidad and Tobago recorded faster rates o f growth when 
compared with the firs t ha lf o f 1996. Fo r the other countries experiencing growth, namely Aruba and 
Barbados, expansion slackened from the pace achieved in the previous year. Both Jamaica and the 
Netherlands Antilles continued to experience contracting output, while the Organization o f Eastern 
Caribbean States (O ECS) countries moved from expansion in  1996 to contraction in the firs t part 
o f 1997. Anecdotal evidence suggests that the rate o f expansion in  the Bahamas and in  Belize also 
slowed in  1997.
Fiscal performance deteriorated in  all instances except Trinidad and Tobago, where a 
deteriorating recurrent account was salvaged by inflows from divestment proceeds. In Aruba and 
Barbados, gains on recurrent account were used to augment capital spending which served to 
increase the deficit. In  Jamaica, both the recurrent account and the overall deficit widened 
significantly succumbing to pressure from debt servicing charges and the decision to support failing 
financial institutions.
External performance weakened in  1997. Merchandise exports were down or stagnating in 
all cases, except Barbados and Trinidad and Tobago, yet imports increased rapidly in  most cases. 
The exception was the Netherlands Antilles which was able to record better performance on 
merchandise account, because o f suppressed demand. Earnings from tourism increased in  all cases 
but were insufficient to offset the deterioration carried forward from the merchandise account, so that 
current accounts deteriorated. Reserves were augmented in  Barbados and Trinidad and Tobago, in  
the latter case because o f privatization proceeds. While complete data were not available fo r Aruba 
and the Netherlands Antilles reserves were thought to have increased in the former but deteriorated 
by about 3 per cent over the firs t quarter o f 1997 in the latter. The reserves fe ll by US$130 m illion 
in Jamaica yielding to the tw in effects o f trade and exchange rate pressures.
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The transition countries as a group recorded measurable growth for the firs t time since the 
collapse o f the Council fo r Mutual Economic Assistance (CM EA). Concealed behind the overall 
average, however, performance was mixed since countries were at significantly different stages in  
the transition from centrally planned to market economies. Accordingly, some countries were 
attaining sim ilar levels o f growth and inflation to those prevailing in  Western Europe, others were 
experiencing financial crises sim ilar to those being experienced by the emerging economies o f Asia, 
while some were s till to achieve a measure o f economic stabilization prior to sustained growth.
Countries such as Poland, the Baltic states, Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania, the Czech and 
Slovak Republics, Hungary and Slovenia had all been applying stabilization and reform programmes 
and had made substantial progress toward integrating their economies into the global economic and 
financial system. A ll had achieved in  excess o f 3 per cent growth and reduced inflation rates to 
under 15 per cent, the median figure for the group as a whole.
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Nevertheless, like the other market driven economies this exposed them to hitherto unknown 
economic uncertainties. The Czech and Slovak currencies, in fact, came under speculative pressures 
at about the same time as Thailand, and for substantially the same reasons, namely, large external 
current account deficits following sluggish export growth, real exchange rate appreciation and doubts 
that the authorities could support the exchange rate w ith the appropriate macroeconomic policies. 
The speculative attacks showed rather the extent to which these economies had become integrated 
into the global financial system but also the need fo r caution as they exposed their s till fragile 
economies and financial institutions to the rough and tumble o f international finance. Nevertheless, 
the setback in these countries did not sp ill over into adjacent countries and was expected to be short­
lived, provided appropriate policies were applied consistently.
Several other economies which had pursued tight financial policies and carried out the 
necessary reforms, such as Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, Kazakhastan, and the Kyrgyz Republic 
had also started to achieve sustained growth w ith falling inflation.
A t the other end o f the spectrum, those encountering greater difficulty in applying the policy 
reforms, or which had resisted implementing them had lagged in  economic performance. The two 
largest transitional economies suffered major contraction, 40 per cent in  Russia and 60 per cent in 
the Ukraine between 1991 and 1996. Nevertheless, the Russian economy might have passed the 
worst and seems to have started to grow again. Moreover, it  is  estimated that growth might be 
underestimated since the official statistics might not have fu lly  accounted fo r some o f the emerging 
private informal activities. The Ukraine has only recently achieved a measure o f stabilization w ith  
falling inflation but the economy continues to contract.
Major weaknesses were evident in the financial institutions o f both countries while the 
restructuring o f State enterprises s till remained to be tackled. Three quarters o f the State enterprises 
were believed to be in  need o f restructuring in  Russia while one half were currently incurring losses 
and one-quarter o f them would probably not be able to regain their solvency. The situation in the 
Ukraine is  thought to be even worse. Farm productivity in both countries, suffering under the 
traditional management and incentive practices, continued to decline while government regulatory 
policies remained pervasive to distort the economy. Expenditure patterns needed reform while the 
tax system was complex and d ifficult to administer.
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GLOBAL TRADE AND MARKET ARRANGEMENTS
GLOBAL TRADE INDICATORS
1993 1994 1995 1996 1997
World Trade Volume <1> 4.0 9.3 9.5 6.2 8.6
Export volumes
Advanced economies 3.3 8.9 8.8 5.6 9.3
Developing countries 6.9 12.7 10.4 8.6 9.6
Import volumes
Advanced economies 1.6 9.7 8.9 6.1 8.0
Developing countries 8.7 7.2 11.7 8.0 8.3
Terms of trade
Advanced economies 0.8 - - 0.1 -0.7
Developing countries -2.1 1 o IkJ 2.6 1.3 -0.8
Fuel exporters -6.7 -1.5 -5.1 5.8 -
Non-Fuel exporters
©1 1.7 1.7 0.3 -
Source: I.M.F. World Economic Outlook (Interim assessment, December 1997); ECLAC. 
<1> Percentage annual changes in goods and services
The volume o f goods and services traded globally expanded at the pace set in 1994 and 1995 
outstripping that o f 1996. Th is  quickened expansion was achieved by the increased volume o f trade 
conducted by the advanced countries fo r the rate o f increase achieved by the developing countries 
increased only marginally. Nevertheless, the rate o f increase achieved by the developing countries 
remained marginally greater than fo r the advanced countries. Fo r 1998 the rate o f increase in  trade 
is projected to decline by about 2.5 per cent to 6.2 per cent. Trade is  projected to slow down more 
in  the advanced countries than in  the developing countries.
Whereas the terms o f trade improved fo r all categories o f exporters in  1996 they either 
declined or remained the same in 1997.Th is is  in part to be explained by the general decline in  real 
prices o f most traded commodities and services as a result o f increasingly competitive global 
markets. In  United States dollar terms the price o f manufactures declined most steeply by 7.3 per 
cent, o il prices declined by 5 per cent while non fuel primary commodities declined by 3.6 per cent. 
These declines were exaggerated by the fairly steep appreciation o f the United States dollar vis à vis 
most major currencies in  1997. Th is  is illustrated when trade is valued in  Special Drawing Rights 
(SD R), where the price o f manufactures s till showed a decline o f 2.3 per cent but o il prices showed 
a slight increase, o f 0.1 per cent, while non-fuel primary commodities increased by 1.6 per cent.
While there was a fairly broad consensus about the need to increase trade, the institutiona l 
arrangements being developed to secure it  continued to differ. The uneasy symbiosis between
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global trading arrangements and those being fashioned at the regional or bilateral level remained. 
Yet in some instances, such as the F TA A , the intention was clearly to go beyond the W TO , which 
was making steady progress, to create a seamless economic and financial environment in  the 
hemisphere which might eventually provide the model for a broader global framework. Sim ilarly, 
the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) seemed intended to pursue the same objective in  
Asia. It took its Information Technology Agreement into the W TO  and was able to secure binding 
global agreements on it.
The W TO  continued to make progress in resolving several o f the issues which remained 
outstanding following the Uruguay Round and in advancing new issues fo r liberalization under the 
General Agreement on Trade in  Services (G A TS). In  December 1996 the W TO  held its first 
ministerial meeting and set the stage for fixture action. In  1997 the W TO , in  its third year o f 
operation, achieved several breakthroughs at the sectoral level. In  the past the General Agreement 
on Ta riffs  and Trade (G A TT) had conducted its business in comprehensive rounds where trade-offs 
across sectors were deemed to be the most effective way o f liberalizing trade. The rapid succession 
o f achievements at the sectoral level in 1997 was, however, unexpected and significant because it 
was achieved in  sectors o f great importance in achieving systemic economic efficiency and global 
integration.
The firs t was an agreement to liberalize international trade in basic telecommunications 
services, whereby 72 members representing 93 per cent o f total domestic and international revenue 
from the sector agreed to open their markets to foreign competition. The services covered in  the 
agreement included voice and data transmission, telex, telegraph, facsimile, private leased circuit 
services, fixed and mobile satellite services, cellular telephony, mobile data services, paging and 
personal telecommunications services. Eight CARICOM countries were party to the agreement, 
which came into effect on 5 February 1998.
The second major agreement was to cut ta riffs on Information Technology Products. 
Accordingly, computers and telecommunications products were subject to ta riff cuts commencing 
July 1997 and concluding w ith ta riff free trade by 2000. These reductions w ill mean liberalizing 600 
billion o f world trade and give consumers access to cheaper information technology products.
Fina lly  on 12 December 1997, 70 countries agreed to open their financial services sectors 
to greater competition9. In  all, 102 countries have multilateral commitments in  the sector. The 
agreement which w ill grant permanent and fu ll most favoured nation status to the participants w ill 
come into force on 1 March 1999, at the latest. It  covers more than 95 per cent o f the trade in 
banking, insurance, securities and financial information. Potential benefits from the liberalization 
o f financial services are greater efficiency in the sector, the provision o f more diverse financial 
services at lower cost, better financial intermediation and investment opportunities and better means 
o f managing risks. Countries remaining outside o f the agreement are less likely to reap these benefits 
and are likely to be less favoured by foreign capital.
9 One of which was a CARICOM country.
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A  high level meeting was also convened in October to assist the least Developed Countries 
to increase their ability to trade. The initiative came out o f the G7 Summit in  June 1996, where it 
was noted that while the Uruguay Round had managed to incorporate several o f the developing 
countries into the emerging global trading system some o f the Least Developed Countries (LDC s) 
were in  danger o f being marginalized by fast changing events. The meeting agreed to provide a trade 
assistance programme and new and improved preferential market access measures to the LD C s as 
a temporary measure to speed their transition to global integration.
Fo r die future the W TO  has committed itse lf to several new issues, such as the relationship 
between trade and investment, the interaction between trade and competition policy and transparency 
in government procurement. It  is also committed to studying the relationship between regional and 
multilateral trading arrangements. Outstanding issues remaining from the built-in agenda o f the 
Uruguay Round were government procurement, where negotiations were scheduled to commence 
in  January 1999, and agriculture where negotiations were scheduled to commence in  January 2000.
In conclusion, the W TO  has been pursuing its agenda w ith unexpected vigour. Initiatives 
being pursued via some o f the regional negotiations w ill complement this work and build upon it, 
although the desire to go beyond the W TO  is not universal in all the regional groups. Whatever the 
outcome o f the tension being created by regional/multilateral initiatives, the agreements being 
reached w ithin the W TO  are themselves o f great significance, and w ill have far reaching effects for 
all Caribbean countries despite the various provisions s till extant to protect developing countries 
from the fu ll force o f globalization. The decision w ith respect to CARICOM  bananas shows the 
extent to which these sentiments have changed. It  is important that all developments in  the W TO  are 
followed with care so that governments can be kept fu lly  apprised o f their implications fo r national 
and regional policies.
The major issue overshadowing E U  policy during 1997 was the run up to the EM U . Th is  
issue is o f special interest to CARICOM  countries since the EM U  seems to be the favoured role 
model for their efforts to coordinate monetary policy. The need to meet the convergence criteria was 
overwhelmingly the most important consideration in  the macroeconomic policies o f most o f the 
larger economies. The exception is the United Kingdom, which is not seeking membership in the 
firs t tier which w ill be selected in May 1998. While this meant fa irly stringent deflationary policies 
throughout the E U , w ith scant hope o f reducing unemployment via reflation, the disciplines required 
are generally thought to be in  the longer-term interest o f these countries.
The lead up to the E M U  was conceived in three distinct stages, the firs t commenced in July 
1990 when all restrictions on the movement o f capital between E U  members was abolished. The  
second stage commenced in  January 1994, with the creation o f the European Monetary Institute 
(EM I). A t this time monetary financing o f budgetary deficits was outlawed and governments were 
no longer allowed privileged access to domestic finance. E U  institutions were also given increased 
power to monitor the economic policies o f member countries. The third stage, which is to commence 
on 1 January 1999, w ill see the European Central Bank (EC B), already existing in  embryo in the 
EM I, take responsibility fo r European monetary policy. A ll exchange rates w ill be locked in and a 
new currency, the Euro, w ill commence circulation among those qualifying to be members.
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Since the commencement o f the second stage, the international community has spent its time 
watching and speculating as to whether the Euro w ill come into being on schedule and i f  so which 
countries would qualify fo r membership. The  issue was shrouded in  doubt until about mid 1997 
since it  was believed that by any strict interpretation o f the accession criteria several o f the major 
economies would not (qualify. However, the advocates o f strict interpretation, led by the German 
Bundesbank, were vanquished by French pressure for a more political interpretation o f the criteria 
and by a proposal by Germany to revalue its gold reserves. Th is was deemed by some to be a means 
o f “cooking the books” and coming from the country backing the most strict interpretation o f the 
criteria, undermined the position o f the Bundesbank. W ith the relaxation o f the criteria the timetable 
was now almost certain to be met, w ith all the interested members being able to qualify10.
A fte r 1999 the design and implementation o f monetary policy w ill sh ift from national 
jurisdiction to the European System o f Central Banks (ESC B) led by the EC B. Considerable 
authority w ill also sh ift from the Bundesbank, which had exclusive control o f the anchor currency 
o f the exchange rate mechanism, the Deutsche mark, which it  administered in  accordance with 
German interests. In  the third stage this anchor role w ill pass to the Euro where monetary policy w ill 
be influenced by all the central banks. Monetary policy decisions w ill be made by the Governing 
Council o f the EC B  which w ill provide instructions and guidelines to its Executive Board, to be 
responsible for its  day to day administration. The primary task o f the ESC B  is  to maintain price 
stability and it  w ill be provided w ith a high degree o f independence in  order to do so. Nevertheless, 
these provisions have been subject to criticism, as to whether there is  enough autonomy, for 
example, in its  relations w ith non-EU currencies or, on the other hand, whether the ESC B is 
sufficiently accountable to member States for its actions.
While monetary policy w ill pass to central control, the same is not true o f fiscal policy since 
the E U  budget is scarcely over 1 per cent o f E U  GDP. Fiscal policy, therefore, remains the province 
o f national governments. Since fiscal deficits can undermine the anti-inflationary goals o f monetary 
policy, provisions were necessary to ensure that fiscal and monetary policies were made compatible. 
In practical terms this means essentially that fiscal deficits and debt needed to be kept in  check, so 
as not to beleaguer E U  partners. Tw o measures have been devised, targets and policy coordination. 
The target value was for the general government’s fiscal deficit not to exceed 3 per cent o f GDP, 
under normal circumstances, and for the general government’s gross debt not to exceed 60 per cent 
o f G DP11. In  “special” circumstances a greater deficit might be allowed and a timetable provided for 
returning to the reference values. Countries incurring deficits outside o f the guidelines, in times not
10 This is not to downplay die significant efforts made and progress achieved in meeting die criteria. For 1997, 
consumer price inflation was expected to be less than 2 per cent on average, with all members, except Greece, falling 
below the 3 per cent target. Fiscal deficits for the EU as a whole were expected to be 2V* per cent of GDP, although 
France, Germany and Italy are likely to have difficulty in meeting it, if the criterion is strictiy applied . This compares 
with an average fiscal deficit of 6.1 per cent in 1993. Interest rate differentials have also fallen to less dian 1 per cent 
across the EU while market exchange rates had also converged. Gross government debt indicators continue to show 
fairly wide divergence, however.
11 Achieving the target for fiscal deficits now seems possible but whether it is sustainable is another matter. 
Italy, for instance, will need to achieve a continuous fiscal surplus of 3 per cent of Product if it is to meet the debt target 
of 60 per cent of Product by the year 2007.
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deemed to be special, could be subject to financial sanctions but the decision to impose sanctions 
w ill be politically determined, by a vote. Aside from fiscal targets, policy w ill also be coordinated 
by the Council which issues broad economic guidelines to members.
Another area o f concern surfacing w ith the formation o f the E M U  was whether countries 
would reduce their resilience to shocks i f  they lost their independence in  monetary policy, for 
example, i f  they were unable to vary the exchange rate or to increase fiscal deficits for that purpose. 
In  the event that a shock impacted all members to more or less the same extent, that is, i f  the shock 
was symmetrical, the general consensus was that little  or nothing would be lost by the application 
o f a common monetary response. The one caveat was placed on the possibility where policies were 
transmitted through to countries at different rates or w ith different degrees o f efficiency, such as 
would allow one country to respond more quickly or more completely to the policies. In  those 
circumstances outcomes could d iffer significantly.
The second instance was where shocks impacted countries in  significantly different ways, 
so that they were asymmetric12. Here independent monetary policy was seen to be o f greater potential 
benefit. Nevertheless, the outcome would depend on whether the shocks were permanent or 
temporary and whether other compensating mechanisms were available to the central authorities, 
such as tax transfers. Another relevant factor was the mobility o f resources. Could labour and capital 
move easily from depressed to booming areas? In  general, asymmetric shocks required a greater 
level o f independence or integration fo r their successful treatment. In  the absence o f exchange rate 
flexib ility and easy labour mobility, which in  Europe is less than in  the United States fo r cultural 
and linguistic reasons, real wage flexibility would be necessary to effect an adjustment to permanent 
asymmetric shocks. Given the lack o f such wage rate flexib ility in  Europe, E M U  signals the need 
for its early adoption i f  that economy is to adapt to its  current and future economic d iffi culties.
Another issue o f importance was the widening o f the E U . The group being considered 
comprised 10 from the former eastern Europe, plus Cyprus. Turkey, another aspirant, was not 
currently being considered. Three issues militated against her. The firs t was fear that Turkish  
workers would flood into Germany, where unemployment was high. The second was fear o f the 
resurgence o f M uslim  fundamentalism in  Turkey, which would not s it well w ith European political 
norms. The third fear was that the current severe economic imbalance, which Turkey was not seen 
to be tackling w ith sufficient vigour, would strengthen the likelihood o f the other two fears being 
realized.
In  the firs t rank o f countries to be considered fo r membership were Poland, Hungary, the 
Czech Republic, Slovenia and Estonia. Membership might be forthcoming to these countries by 
2005, i f  all went smoothly. Deferred fo r later consideration until their economic policies qualified 
were Bulgaria, Latvia, Lithuania and Romania. Slovakia would need to improve its  human rights 
record before being considered fo r entry. Several issues, revolving around financing, need to be 
resolved before accession, not the least o f which was the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) which
12 For example, a significant change in the price of oil would impact producers and consumers in a common 
monetary arrangement in significantly different ways.
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would be destabilized by the accession o f several new agricultural producers. Another issue in 
contention related to transfers to the less developed regions, the main current beneficiaries, namely 
Italy, Spain and Portugal, resisting any diversion o f regional funds to the new entrants. Net 
contributors, such as Germany, were also wary about the need for increased payments. Several o f 
the original members, led by France, were also concerned that their influence would be diluted by 
the accession o f new members and wanted constitutional reforms to secure their status. Finally, the 
entry o f Cyprus was complicated by its divided status, several members believing that this issue 
needed resolution prior to accession. Resolution o f the divided status o f Cyprus would require the 
cooperation o f Turkey, while Greece indicated that i f  the decision to admit Cyprus was deferred it 
would veto the whole issue o f new membership.
Finally the E U  was reviving the issue o f EU /U S trade talks. While the bulk o f trade has been 
liberalized several issues remained outstanding, notably agricultural products, audiovisual products, 
shipping and textiles, the firs t two being protected by the E U , especially France, while the last two 
were specially protected by the United States. The idea o f new talks had been approved by the 
European Commission, but must receive approval by member States, while the United States is yet 
to demonstrate a sense o f urgency for beginning these talks. W hile fast track authority was turned 
down in  November o f 1997 it  was believed by some to have a better chance o f being passed for 
negotiations w ith Europe, especially since labour rates were more closely compatible vsith the E U  
than with Latin America or with Asia. Moreover, w ith the financial difficulties in  Asia iind what is 
perceived to be a reduction o f interest in the F TA A  by some Latin American countries, especially 
Brazil, observers on both sides are coming to the view that the time for revitalizing EU /U S talks is  
right.
Developments in the E U  hold significance for the region. E ffo rts to consolidate the single 
market and the E M U  provide useful lessons for those seeing the E U  as a prototype fo r Caribbean 
initiatives. The process o f widening also invites some parallels, while global initiatives raise 
questions about how the common market aspects o f the Union w ill interface w ith global 
developments. Bu t the parallels between the two groups can be over-drawn. The European project 
is proceeding w ith enormous effort and the application o f considerable human and material 
resources, in part because o f a common desire to contain the extremely destructive tensions and 
enmities o f the past. The issue o f widening involves some o f these same concerns, as well as others 
made more pointed by the cold war period. The rationale for Caribbean integration is quite different 
and derives from people o f sim ilar historic circumstances having a strong affinity and desire to assist 
each other to do better. The Caribbean effort is, therefore, driven by different motives and has at its 
disposal significantly more modest resources to draw upon. It  is also by its  nature a more modest 
proposal and much less likely to achieve critical mass in  global terms. Yet the desire to strengthen 
its  functional cooperation activities can provide significant functional and psychic benefits for its  
members.
The negotiations leading to the F TA A  have reached a major turning point. Since its inception 
participants had spent their time gathering information and identifying the various issues for 
negotiation. A t the second Summit o f the Americas, held in Santiago, Chile from 18-19 A pril 1998, 
the 34 participating countries agreed to commence the negotiations w ith the agreement scheduled 
to come into effect in  January 2005.
A t the second summit the structure o f the negotiations were also set, w ith the Trade 
Negotiating Committee (TN C ) scheduled to convene no later than 30 June 1998. The TN C  would 
oversee the tempo and organizational arrangements o f the working groups. The site o f the 
negotiations, which would rotate between Miami, Panama and Mexico City, was also agreed and the 
supporting administrative arrangements based on the previous tripartite arrangements confirmed. The 
latter remained a fa irly light structure, mandated simply to provide logistical and administrative 
support, translation services, and secure, publish and distribute official documents. The chairmanship 
o f the process was also selected to rotate between Canada, Argentina and Ecuador, w ith a jo int 
chairmanship comprising B ra zil and the United States to cover the last phase, from 2002 to the end 
o f the negotiation. The consultative group on smaller economies was also created to follow the 
FTA A  process. It could bring to the attention o f the TN C  issues o f concern and it  could also make 
recommendations to it. A  civil society committee was also created, to deal comprehensively with 
growing concerns about globalization. The committee w ill include representatives o f die 
environmental movement, labour unions, consumer groups and business interests. Several initiatives 
in areas other than trade were also unveiled, w ith respect to education, poverty reduction, governance 
and drugs.
Despite the progress made in the interim the mood o f participants had changed significantly 
since the firs t summit in  December 1994. A t that time the United States took the initiative to broaden 
the arrangements, recently agreed under N A FTA , to quicken the pace o f trade liberalization which 
was believed to be too cumbersome when conducted via the G A TT/W TO  route. Simultaneously, 
potential members were anxious to jo in  the F TA A  so as not to be denied benefits which were 
perceived to be flowing to Mexico. The model envisaged at that time was a docking arrangement 
to N A FTA  w ith Chile being firs t in  the queue to dock.
Since then the W TO  came into being and has made perceptible movement on the multilateral 
front. M ERC O SU R has developed a momentum o f its own and widened its  membership to include 
Chile and Bolivia  as associate members, the former being the candidate most favoured, but 
subsequently ignored, by the United States for membership in N A FTA . Since its inception, trade has 
increased rapidly w ithin M ERC O SU R  and together w ith better macroeconomic performance 
fostered increased se lf confidence amongst its members. Just prior to the second summit, 
M ERC O SUR signed a framework agreement w ith the Andean community comprising Venezuela, 
Colombia, Ecuador, Peru and Bolivia to create a South American Free Trade Area (SA FTA ) by the 
year 2000. It also plans a wide ranging F TA A  type negotiation w ith the E U  commencing in  1999.
The United States administration, fo r its part, ran into persistent difficulties receiving fast 
track negotiating mandate. Several issues mitigated against fast track, including the Mexican peso 
crisis and fears o f widened financial obligations, reduced enthusiasm for free trade agreements and 
the opposition o f labour and environmental groups. W hile fast track authority is not essential for 
the negotiations to proceed, failure to achieve it has been interpreted by some as signifying a possible 
diminution o f interest in  hemispheric trade liberalization and might lose the United States the 
momentum in defining the pace and shape o f the negotiations. Greater familiarity with the workings 
o f N A FTA  also led some to question the desirability o f embracing so comprehensive a relationship. 
Smaller countries, especially, fear that they w ill be virtually without a voice during the negotiations
and subsequently, when it  becomes necessary to defend their interests in  what is  expected to be 
labyrinthine trade arrangements.
Finally, the financial difficulties in Asia w ill impinge on hemispheric initiatives. Reduced 
capital inflows w ill require a new round o f austerity in several La tin American countries and w ill 
create new uncertainties for their business interests. A  new more intense phase o f global competition 
is  expected to commence in 1998, as lire adjusting economies in  Asia and Latin America jockey for 
limited global markets. Given the overvaluation o f some Latin American currencies, their relatively 
low productivity and the dynamism which they have enjoyed within the confines o f M ERC O SUR, 
they may be hesitant about opening their markets further to global competition, at least in the short 
term. Th is is thought to be one o f the reasons fo r B ra zil’s early effort to control the pace o f the trade 
negotiations and fo r the seeming coalition o f forces into two negotiating groups, w ith N A FTA  on 
one side and M ERC O SU R  on the other. It  might also help to explain the urgency in  transforming 
M ERC O SUR into SA FTA . Currently, N A FTA  comprises 392 m illion people w ith GDP o f U S$ 8.6 
trillion, and inter group trade o f US$44 billion. Mercosur for its part comprises a population o f 204 
m illion, GDP o f US$1.2 trillio n  w ith inter group trade o f US$19 billion. Chile adds 12 m illion  
people to M ERC O SU R  while the Andean group adds a further 100 m illion.
Despite these complications, the F TA A  remains a comprehensive project which reaches far 
beyond the issues o f trade. Areas such as financial flows, investment and competition policies, 
democratic governance, property rights, education, the judiciary and multilateral cooperation are 
being included in  the negotiations. The formation o f a c ivil society committee to include several o f 
the proponents and opponents o f globalization is a timely development which is  necessary i f  the 
process is to proceed with a broad consensus. While this comprehensive agenda w ill complicate the 
negotiating process, it  also broadens the constituency o f interest in  the FTA A . I f  successful, the 
resulting agreement would represent a new kind o f relationship in  the hemisphere and a possible 
template fo r future multilateral initiatives.
C A RIC O M ’s integration efforts are evolving in  a complex web o f activities intended to 
integrate their economies at the subregional level and into the wider hemisphere. These include 
measures to complete the deepening and widening o f CARICOM itse lf, secure the consolidation o f 
the Association o f Caribbean States (ACS) and fashion a place for its members in  the comprehensive 
FTA A  by 2005. These initiatives must also pay due attention to existing relationships w ith the E U  
and prepare fo r new ones that are compatible with hemispheric initiatives. Finally, they must all be 
made compatible w ith developments at the global level, especially as they evolve in  the W TO .
W ith in CARICOM, work continued in the survey year to consolidate the single market and 
economy (C SM E), the major elements o f which were to be in  place by 1999. The C E T entered in  
its fourth and final phase in  1998, although the degree o f compliance varied from country to country, 
either as a result o f slippages in  administrative procedures or, as in  the case o f Belize, derogations 
which allowed that country to implement the provisions two years behind the agreed schedule. 
Moreover, the coverage o f the C E T  was not universal, since several products remained exempt 
through the various lists, as a result o f lobbying from interested parties.
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Other institutional arrangements were being put into place to establish the single market and 
economy w ithin CARICOM. Rather than replacing the original Treaty o f Chaguaramas, which came 
into effect in 1973, the governments decided to enact a series o f protocols to the Treaty to effect the 
necessary changes. The firs t o f these, relating to the new institutional structures for decision-making 
and implementation was signed in  February 1997. It  confirmed the status o f the Community as an 
association o f sovereign States, reaffirmed the Conference as the supreme organ o f the Community 
and established more efficient and flexible procedures for decision-making while also rationalizing 
the organizational structure o f the Community. The Common Market Council (CMC) was 
superseded by the Community Council o f M inisters comprising ministers o f CARICOM affairs, 
while four other councils were created, namely the Council fo r Trade and Economic Development, 
the Council fo r Foreign and Community Relations, the Council for Human and Social Development 
and the Council fo r Finance and Planning.
Several governments had already put into place arrangements fo r national consultations on 
CARICO M  matters. Simultaneously, the Charter o f C iv il Society was brought into effect. It  is  
declaratory but emphasizes the obligation o f CARICOM States to good governance and to respect 
civil, political and economic rights and the rule o f law.
A second protocol which allowed CARICOM  nationals to establish business enterprises, 
provide services and move capital without restriction w ithin the common market was also signed 
by 11 o f the 13 members eligible to do so. Measures to facilitate production integration w ithin 
CARICOM  were also being developed while legal provisions were adopted by eight members so 
far to allow the free movement o f certain skilled personnel. Protocols relating to disadvantaged 
countries regions and sectors, agricultural policy, industrial policy, trade policy, dispute settlement, 
competition policy and transportation are scheduled fo r completion by the next meeting o f the 
Conference o f Heads o f Governments in  July 1998.
The Council o f Central Bank Governors was also developing a macroeconomic policy 
framework to facilitate macroeconomic convergence by the members o f the common market. 
Initia lly convergence is being sought via the 3-12-36-15 criteria, which targets three months foreign 
exchange cover for 12 months, 36 months o f exchange rate stability and a debt service ratio o f under 
15 per cent. The ultimate objective o f this exercise is to create a Caribbean Monetary Union, 
modeled closely on that o f the E U . Th is  is a complex project which w ill suffer many o f the 
conceptual uncertainties, costs and benefits as outlined in  the section dealing w ith the EM U .
Whether the project can proceed w ith despatch to monetary union remains to be seen. 
Attempts to secure uniform policies in  the medium term in  some areas are likely to emphasize the 
differing economic tempos and policy orientations among members. Lessons can, however, be 
learned from past experience in  the Caribbean or recent developments in Asia, in  areas such as 
exchange rate policy and the extent and sequencing o f events leading to the liberalization o f the 
capital account. Nevertheless, there is clear advantage to be gained from regular meetings o f 
CARICO M  central bankers, working toward the application o f best practices in  their respective 
countries. Monitoring national performance and the development o f an early warning mechanism 
to alert on errant behaviour can only be to the benefit o f the countries. By  itse lf the adoption o f 
sound policies w ill ultimately lead to the convergence o f economic indicators w ithin CARICOM
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and, o f far greater importance, it w ill allow CARICOM members to converge w ith best practice 
globally. Increasingly, best practice criteria w ill determine the extent to which outsiders interact with 
CARICOM  countries.
The free movement o f goods w ithin CARICOM has been substantially achieved, with 
unauthorized barriers being applicable only to five commodities and three countries. Yet this 
achievement is, in effect, a transitional arrangement to the regime being negotiated for the FTA A  
and that evolving via the W TO . Sim ilarly, w ith attempts to achieve the free movement o f capital 
w ithin CARICOM , since sim ilar elements w ill be included in the F TA A  and are already widely 
practiced globally. Sim ilar comments apply also to the double taxation treaty which is currently in  
operation among the seven signatories and the Social Security Agreement which has come into effect 
among the four countries that have so far signed the agreement.
The widening o f the common market was also being pursued, Suriname was admitted to fu ll 
membership while observer and associate member status was accorded to the Dominican Republic, 
Puerto Rico, the B ritish  V irg in Islands, and the Tu rks and Caicos islands. Ha iti was provisionally 
accepted to fu ll membership o f the Community in July 1997, w ith the terms and conditions o f 
membership to be resolved before July 1998.
CARICO M  has also advanced the structure whereby it  w ill coordinate and execute its 
external negotiations in  those areas where it  needs to negotiate as a group. A  chief negotiator has 
been appointed who w ill oversee and coordinate these negotiations. Four specialized negotiating 
groups have been established, to cover Lomé/Europe; Western Hemisphere; Summit o f the 
Americas, non-economic issues; and, global trade and economic issues including the W TO . The 
issues clustering under the Western Hemisphere group include, Summit o f the Americas economic 
issues leading to the FTA A , N A FTA , N A FTA  parity proposals and Caribbean Basin trade expansion 
initiatives.
Uncertainty surrounds some elements o f the CARICOM single market and economy. The 
uncertainty derives from the pace and extent o f several parallel actions being pursued at the global 
level. The global project is rapidly moving toward the free movement o f goods, services and factors, 
with the exception o f unskilled labour at the global level. A t worst the CARICOM  project, i f  
completed before the main functional elements o f the global project, w ill serve as a transition to it. 
Nevertheless, the several areas o f functional cooperation, including the coordination o f foreign 






In billions of US dollars
1993 1994 1995 1996 1997
Total
Net private capital flows 162.4 147.2 191.5 259.3 181.5
Net official flows 21.2 8.4 40.6 -25,5 1,6
Change in reserves <1> -74.5 -72.7 -112.6 -114.6 -98.8
Developing countries
Net private capital- flows 142.0 116.2 149.4 216.3 144.6
Net official flows 20.0 19.7 32.8 -16.1 -2.4
Change in reserves <1> -40.7 -42.9 -63.5 -100.6 -58.3
Africa
Net private capital flows 2.8 9.0 10.9 12.9 6.8
Net official flows 5.9 7.5 6.9 0.9 1.2
Change in reserves <1> 0.0 -5.1 -0.5 -6.9 -6.6
Asia
Net private capital flows 53.4 62.4 89.2 101.2 34.2
Net official flows 9.9 5.9 5.6 4.5 12.4
Change in reserves <1> -26.1 -39.9 -28.2 -50.2 -22.3
Middle East and Europe
Net private capital flows 22.6 -1.0 12.2 19.1 15.7
Net official flows 4.3 10.5 -1.6 -6.9 -7.9
Change in reserves <1> 6.7 -1.9 -8.9 -16.1 -10.2
Latin America and the Caribbean
Net private capital flows 63.3 45.8 37.1 83.1 87.9
Net official flows -0.1 -4.3 21.9 -14.7 -8.1
Change in reserves <1> -21.3 4.0 -25.8 -27.4 -19.1
Countries in transition
Net private capital flows 12.1 17.3 29.5 28.6 30.0
Net official flows 3.0 -11.0 8.5 -8.8 4.4
Change in reserves <1> -12.4 -8.7 -34.7 -0.4 -16.9
Newly industrialized economies <2>
Net pri vate capital flows 8.3 13.6 12.6 14.3 6.8
Net official flows -1.9 -0.3 -0.7 -0.6 -0.5
Change in reserves <1> -21.4 -21.1 -14.5 -13.6 -23.6
Source: I.M.F. World Economic Outlook (Interim assessment, December 1997). 
<1> A minus sign indicates an increase.
<2> Group comprises Hong Kong, South Korea, Singapore, Taiwan and Israel.
Net private capital flows to the developing, transitional and newly industrializing countries 
declined by almost one third in  1997. Several factors contributed to the change, most notably the
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increased interest rates and economic activity in  the advanced economies, which increased the 
attractiveness o f investment in those countries, and the perception o f increased risk in the developing 
countries, following macroeconomic instability and capital flight in Asia. W hile the flow o f private 
capital to most regions contracted, its  retreat was not universal. Private capital flows to Latin  
America actually increased by just over 5 per cent, while flows to the countries in  transition 
increased by ju st under 5 per cent. Not surprisingly, the greatest decrease in  private capital flows 
was to Asia which received 66 per cent less than in 1996, but flows to Africa also declined by over 
47 per cent, while flows to the Middle East and southern Europe declined by a more modest 18 per 
cent.
In Asia the main decline in  private capital flows took place in  short term finance which grew 
rapidly from ju st over U S$2 billion in 1992 to US$34.4 b illion in 1996. The trend was severely 
reversed in 1997 w ith a net outflow o f US$17 billion. The countries most affected by the reversal 
in short term capital were Thailand US$-12.6 billion, Taiwan, US$-2.6, China US$-0.8 and Malaysia 
US$-0.6. Net direct investment to Asia also declined by 13 per cent. The countries showing the 
greatest contraction in  direct investment were China, Indonesia and the Phillippines while net 
portfolio investment declined from US$7.9 billion in 1996 to just US$0.2 billion in 1997, the largest 
reversals being evident in Thailand and the Phillippines although large outflows were evident from 
Singapore, for the second year running.
Net o ffic ia l flo w s were barely positive in 1997, as compared w ith outflows o f 25.5 billion  
in 1996. Fo r the developing countries as a group, however, the outflows continued although the rate 
o f repatriation contracted from US$16 b illion in  1996 to US$2.4 b illion in  1997. The one-third 
increase in official flows to Africa, was easily understood especially as it  represented a relatively 
modest jump from US$0.9 to US$1.2 billion. Latin America also suffered net outflows o f official 
capital although the rate o f outflow was less than in 1996. The bulk o f official inflows, representing 
a 175 per cent increase, however, went to assist the distressed Asian countries to regain their 
economic stability.
The magnitude o f flows to Asia is  illustrated by the fact that W orld Bank disbursements for 
1998 have been projected upward from the US$2 billion allocated at the end o f 1997 to US$11 
billion, to accommodate financial packages negotiated for Asia and the emerging economies. 
Disbursements are expected to rise further to US$14 billion in 1999. Some observers are concerned 
that the increased exposure o f the World Bank comes at the expense o f aid to the poorest countries, 
debt re lie f efforts and provisions to countries facing natural disasters and other emergencies. The 
increased exposure has also raised questions about Bank profitability and the future cost o f money 
to the middle income countries.
The decline in  both official and private capital flows to developing countries means that 
compensatory adjustments w ill need to be made by them to reduce imports and to increase exports 
in sum equivalent to the decline in capital flows. The two other options are less feasible. Running 
down the reserves is only a short-term option until more permanent measures can be put into place. 
Delay in  such circumstances would be expensive. Private borrowing abroad would be more
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expensive in  view o f the trend to increased interest rates and the heightened perception o f risk. 
Institutional borrowing is  likely to be increased hence the efforts by the IM F  to increase its 
resources, but would be limited to those countries in greatest need13. It  would only be approved on 
evidence o f credible domestic adjustment efforts.
Fo r many countries adjustment w ill mean reduced domestic demand and reduced rates o f 
economic expansion as imports are compressed and domestic production is  diverted to export 
markets. Th is  is the most plausible option, which has already been exercised by B ra zil and Chile 
outside o f Asia. Delay in  making these adjustments can be expensive. As more o f these countries 
try  to export their way out o f the necessary domestic contraction they are likely to face increased 
competition for limited export markets. A  new round o f currency depreciations is  possible in  Latin  
America where some currencies are overvalued. Hopefully this adjustment can be contained without 
setting o ff further depreciations in  Asia, especially in  China14.
Any hope o f a rapid adjustment for these countries w ill depend upon the level o f demand in 
the developed countries. The main markets which would need to increase imports are the United 
States, the E U  and Japan. Th is  raises the perennial problem o f the Japanese surplus and the United 
States deficit. A t the end o f 1997 the United States current account deficit stood at US$178 billion  
and was projected to rise to US$230 b illion in  1998. Any effort by the United States to increase its 
imports sufficient to absorb the excess supply w ill be sure to spark incipient protectionist sentiments 
in  that country, despite the fact that imports could help to reduce inflationary tendencies in an 
economy running at fu ll steam.
Hopes o f significant Japanese reflation are receding as that country continues its cautious 
fiscal policy, which in  turn continues to fuel the increase in  its current account surplus. The option 
o f a fiscal deficit could be beneficial to Japan and the other Asian economies in  the short run and 
unlikely to damage the Japanese economy in  the longer run since it  could borrow money currently 
at 1.9 per cent. Japan also had a modest net public debt, 18 per cent o f GDP at the end o f 1997.
Members o f the third potential market, the introspective E U  are mostly preoccupied with 
deflationary policies in  order to qualify fo r membership in the E M U  in  May 1998. They have 
planned fo r some domestic deflation and have themselves sought to overcome weak domestic 
demand via exports. Currently they seem to be less concerned at this stage w ith global developments 
than about qualifying fo r the EM U . Issues, such as this, w ill probably be the subject o f internal 
negotiations w ithin the G7.
The decline in  official flows which has been evident in the Caribbean fo r some lime has not 
been significantly compensated by private flows to many countries. Some, such as Jamaica, have
13 By the end of 1997 the IMF had committed US$36 billion to Asian economies in difficulty.
14 China, which is currently being investigated to ascertain whether it qualifies for membership in the WTO, 
has pointed to its restraint in this regard as a factor justifying membership.
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been the beneficiaries o f  short-term capital inflows taking advantage o f interest rate differentials, 
although these flows have been induced as a result o f macroeconomic imbalance and have not made 
any significant impact on long-term investment. On the contrary, they have inflated lhe money 
supply and increased fiscal spending to sterilize it, put pressure on the exchange rate, financed 
imports to erode the current account o f  the balance o f payments and generally complicated 
macroeconomic management. Ways will, nevertheless, need to be found for Caribbean countries to 
derive lasting benefits from international capital flows since the traditional flows from official and 
multilateral sources are likely to become even more scarce. Mention has been made elsewhere o f the 
need to pursue macroeconomic policies which will sustain interest rates at only a small premium 
over global rates, so that domestic firms can borrow at rates which do not differ significantly from 
those o f their international competitors. Other measures to induce private foreign investment or joint 
ventures are also needed to supplement macro policies and include attention to infrastructure, 
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